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Having read the review, I should now read the book. I intend to try to cram it into my overstuffed schedule. I don’t think I need to read it, though, to be convinced that our leaders should avoid vicious and hateful statements. But that’s a moral judgment, not a legal one. I can refuse to vote for anyone who says anything I find objectionable or for anyone supports or fails to condemn expressions by others that do not meet with my approval. This is, however, entirely separate from the question of whether my disapproval or the disapproval of others should have the force of law
I think the arguments Waldron makes for hate speech laws, as summarized by Justice Stevens, should be taken arguments against those types of laws. I object precisely to the Rawlsian justification. Laws against murder or robbery define objective acts as illegal. But “hate speech” is defined in terms of the social order someone wants to use the laws to create. According to a key sentence in the review, “Waldron believes that we have overprotected speech that not only causes significant harm to the dignity of minority groups but also, more importantly, diminishes the public good of inclusiveness that is an essential attribute of our society.” Here, it seems clear that hate speech laws are not sanctions for objective violations, but political weapons to be wielded by partisans of social reform who manage to get control of the legal machinery.
Respect for the dignity of others, whether as individuals or as categories, is a wonderful moral tenet. Prosecuting people because they are seen as failing to conform to someone’s political program of “inclusiveness” cannot be reconciled with a free society.